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Boeing 737 MAX 8 Crashes: Lion Air & Ethiopian Airlines

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Boeing 737 MAX 8 Crashes: Lion Air & Ethiopian Airlines

 
Old 03-15-2019, 08:12 PM
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OK, that made me laugh.

Of course, at first I was like :wtf: ?
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Old 03-15-2019, 09:24 PM
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‘Don’t Ground the Airplanes. Ground the Pilots.’

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Old 03-16-2019, 08:44 PM
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Because they never received proper training?!
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Old 03-17-2019, 11:51 AM
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/ethiopi...sh-11552839318

Ethiopian Airlines Black Boxes Showed ‘Clear Similarities’ With Lion Air Crash

Data from ET302 black boxes has been validated by Ethiopian, U.S. Investigators, transport minister says

March 17, 2019

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia—Data retrieved from the black boxes of a crashed Ethiopian Airlines plane was similar to that from the Lion Air flight that plunged into the Java Sea in October, Ethiopia’s transport minister said Sunday, adding to the pressure on aircraft Boeing Co.

“Clear similarities were noted between Ethiopian Air Flight 302 and Indonesian Lion Air Flight 610, which will be the subject of further study during the investigation,” Transport Minister Dagmawit Moges said. Both flights were on Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft.

Ms. Moges declined to give details of the similarities that had been identified, including whether Boeing’s new anti-stalling software that has been associated with the Lion Air flight had been activated. She spoke after French air accident investigations bureau BEA had sent the data from both the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder to Ethiopian authorities.

Investigators from both Ethiopia and the U.S National Transportation Safety Board have validated the data, she said, and a preliminary report on the accident will be published within 30 days.
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Old 03-17-2019, 04:10 PM
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737 MAX - MCAS

^^^^ lot of related MCAS info in one link.

At the bottom of that page is a photo of the trim cutout switches. Behind them (forward in the aircraft), you can see the large (black) manual trim wheels for each pilot.
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Old 03-17-2019, 09:40 PM
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Boeing: America's Best And Brightest

Long but worth reading on series of design changes needed to get the larger fan engines on the Max and other tech and business issues.

https://market-ticker.org/akcs-www?post=235332

​​​​​​Boeing is commonly considered emblematic of America's "superiority" and "capability."

Boeing is, you see, an "aerospace" company. Full of smart people who design and build good products.

Not just a firm that has jumped on the scam-wagon of "software as a service" to juice both their profits and stock price, while screwing everyone else in the ass.

No, you're not supposed to get screwed up the ass at 300kts by the seat you're sitting in that has their corporate name on it.... right?

Let me note up front -- I'm not a pilot. I am, however, a software and hardware guy with a few decades of experience, including writing quite a lot of code that runs physical "things", some of them being quite large, complex, expensive and, if something goes wrong, potentially dangerous. Flight isn't all that complex at its core; it's simply a dance comprised of lift, gravity, thrust and drag. What makes it complex is the scale and physical limits we wish to approach or exceed (e.g. you want to go how fast, in air how thin, with a distance traveled of how far and with how many people on board along with you as well as with a bunch of other aircraft in the air at the same time?)

The sequence of circumstances that has left the 737MAX to arguably have the worst hull safety rating in the history of commercial jet aviation appears, from what I can figure out reading public sources, to have basically gone something like this:
  • The 737, a venerable design with literal millions of flight hours, a nice, predictable handling paradigm and an excellent safety record (the basic design of the hull is 50 years old!) was running into competition resulting from its older-series engines that bypassed less air (and thus are less efficient in their consumption of fuel.) Boeing sought to correct this competitive disadvantage to keep selling new airplanes.
  • The means to correct the efficiency problem is to use newer, higher-bypass engines which, in order to obtain their materially lower fuel consumption, are physically larger in diameter.
  • The aircraft's main landing gear has to fit in the space available. To make the larger engines fit the landing gear has to be made longer (and thus larger, bigger and stronger) or the engines will hit the ground when taking off and landing.
  • The longer landing gear for where the original design specified the engines to go (but with the larger engines) would not fit in the place where it had to go when it was retracted.
  • Boeing, instead of redesigning the hull including wings, tail and similar from the ground up for larger engines, which would have (1) taken quite a lot of time and (2) been very expensive, because (among other things) it would require a full, new-from-zero certification, decided to move the engines forward in their mounting point which allowed them to be moved upward as well, and thus the landing gear didn't have to be as long, heavy and large -- and will fit.
  • However, moving the engines upward and forward caused the handling of the aircraft to no longer be nice and predictable. As the angle of attack (that is, the angle of the aircraft relative to the "wind" flowing over it) increased the larger, more-forward and higher mounted engines caused more lift to appear than expected.
  • To compensate for thatBoeing programmed a computer to look at the angle of attack of the aircraft and have the computer, without notice to the pilots and transparently add negative trim as the angle-of-attack increased.
  • In other words instead of fixing the hardware, which would have been very expensive since it would have required basically a whole new airplane be designed from scratch it appears Boeing decided to put a band-aid on the issue in software and by doing so act like there was no problem at all when it fact it was simply covered up and made invisible to the person flying the plane by programming a computer to transparently hide it.
  • Because Boeing had gone to a "everything we can possibly stick on the list is an option at extra cost and we will lease that to you on an hours-run basis, you don't buy it", exactly as has been done with engines and other parts including avionics in said aircraft, said shift being largely responsible for the rocket shot higher in the firm's stock price over the last several years, the standard configuration only included one angle-of-attack sensor. A second one, and a warning in the cockpit that the two don't agree is an extra cost option and was not required for certification! (Update: There is some question as to whether there is one or two, but it appears if there are two physically present the "standard" configuration only USES one at any given time. Whether literally or effectively it appears the "standard" configuration has one.)
  • Most of the certification compliance testing and documentation is not done by the FAA any more. It's done by the company itself which "self-certifies" that everything is all wonderful, great, and has sufficient redundancy and protections to be safe to operate in the base, certified configuration. In short there is no requirement that a third, non-conflicted and competent party look at everything in the design and sign off on it -- and thus nobody did, and the plane was granted certification without requiring active redundancy in those sensors.
  • Said extra cost option and display was not on either the Lion Air or Ethiopian jets that crashed. It is on the 737MAX jets being flown by US carriers, none of which have crashed.
  • It has been reported that the jackscrew, which as the name implies is a long screw that sets the trim angle on the elevator, has been recovered from the Ethiopian crash, is intact and was in the full downposition. No pilot in his right mind would intentionally command such a setting, especially close to the ground. It is therefore fair to presume until demonstrated otherwise that the computer put the jackscrew in that position and not the pilot.
  • Given where the jackscrew was found, and that there is no reasonable explanation for the pilot having commanded it to be there, why is the computer allowed to put that sort of an extreme negative trim offset on the aircraft in the first place? Is that sort of negative offset capability reasonable under the design criteria for the software "hack-around-the-aerodynamics" issue? Has nobody at Boeing heard of a thing called a "limit switch"?
  • It has been reported from public information that both Lion Air and the Ethiopian jet had wild fluctuations in their rate of climb or descent and at the time they disappeared from tracking both were indicating significant rates of climb. For obvious reasons you do not hit the ground if you have a positive rate of altitude change unless you hit a cumulogranite cloud (e.g. side of a mountain or similar), which is not what happened in either case.
  • The data source for that public information on rate of climb or descent did not come from radar; while I don't have a definitive statement on the data source public information makes clear it almost-certainly came from a transponder found on most commercial airliners known as ADS-B. Said transponder is on the airplane itself. It's obvious that the data in question was either crap, materially delayed or it was indicating insanely wild fluctuations in the aircraft's vertical rate of speed (which no pilot would cause intentionally) since you don't hit the ground while gaining altitude and if the transponder was sending crap data that ground observers were able to receive the obvious implication is that the rest of the aircraft's instruments and computers were also getting crap data of some kind and were acting on it, leading to the crazy vertical speed profile.
  • The Lion Air plane that crashed several months ago is reported to have had in its log complaints of misbehavior consistent with this problem in the days before it crashed. I have not seen reports that the Ethiopian aircraft had similar complaints logged. Was this because it hadn't happened previously to that specific aircraft or did the previous crews have the problem but not log it?
  • The copilot on the Ethiopian aircraft was reported to have had a grand total of 200 hours in the air. I remind you that to get a private pilots license in the US to fly a little Cessna, by yourself, in good weather and without anyone on board compensating you in any way you must log at least 40 hours. Few people are good enough to pass, by the way, with that 40 hours in the air; most students require more. To get a bare commercial certificate (e.g. you can take someone in your aircraft who pays you something) you must have logged 250 hours in the US, with at least 100 of them as pilot-in-command and 50 of them cross-country. The "first officer" on that flight didn't even meet the requirements in the US to take a person in a Cessna 172 single-engine piston airplane for a 15 minute sightseeing flight!
  • The odds of the one pilot who actually was a commercial pilot under US rules in the cockpit of the Ethiopian flight having trained on the potential for this single-data-source failure of the aircraft and what would happen if it occurred (thus knowing how to recognize and take care of it) via simulator time or other meaningful preparation is likely zero. The odds of the second putative flight officer having done so are zero; he wasn't even qualified to fly a single-engine piston aircraft for money under US rules.
Boeing claims they'll have a "software patch" out later this month to "fix" the problem, essentially admitting that bad sensor data in combination with automated authority to change control inputs is the likely cause of both crashes.

This leads me to ask the obvious question: How can a "software fix" resolve the issue?

If there is only one sensor on the aircraft then there is only one sensor; software cannot "invent" hardware that does not exist. While it is likely possible (and probably not even that hard) to have (for example) the onboard GPS receiver check its rate-of-climb (e.g. rate at which the altitude recorded by the GPS is changing) data with the AOA indication and alert if the two are wildly out of agreement you are just using a better bandaid to hide what is, at its core, a physical design problem.

I've done plenty of embedded coding work -- software that runs a physical thing. A few of the physical things I've written software to run were potentially quite dangerous to property if things went wrong with them and a couple had the potential to kill people. Putting software hackery on top of a physical issue and calling it "no big deal" is a bad idea; it is far, far better from an engineering and safety perspective to figure out why the physical issue exists and solve it there instead. The problem is that when you find an issue like this after making a large investment before the discovery is made the temptation is very strong to try to find a way to mask, hide or otherwise "evade" the effects instead of going back and fixing it.

Never mind the apparent lack of physical limits in the system to prevent that sort of extreme trim application by the computer in the first place. It's not enough to trust a position encoder even if you have redundancy (e.g. two of them) if a failure can break things or kill people.

It appears, if indications are correct, that's what's happened in this instance, and the "we lease 'em and here's a bunch of extra cost options you can have for just the additional low per-hour price of $X", along with masking a handling issue instead of dealing with it in the base design, coupled with no disinterested third-party experts signing off on all of the critical elements of said design shaved the margins of safety far enough that two planes went into the dirt while full of people.

The real ugly question, however, is this: How many more of these sorts of bandaid-style patches are in current commercial aircraft designs, shortly followed by this question, which Reuters is sniffing around but won't come out and say it:

WHO IS BLOWING PEOPLE AT THE FAA, WHAT ARE THEY GETTING IN EXCHANGE, AND GEE IS THAT LINKED TO BOEING'S STOCK PRICE BEING ON SUCH A TEAR THE LAST FEW YEARS?

I have no idea -- but I have a nasty suspicion that I wouldn't like the answer to those questions if I did know.
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Old 03-18-2019, 05:58 AM
  #87  
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The MCAS system had a fatal flaw in that the system had the ability to reset itself, even after pilot input. That means that even if the pilots took evasive action to correct a pitch problem, the MCAS would sometimes correct itself and disregard the pilot input.
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Old 03-18-2019, 09:00 AM
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Originally Posted by gatrhumpy View Post
Because they never received proper training?!
I agree it wasn't a great title to the article but some of the text is good in describing the problem and solutions

​​​​​​-Boeing’s design deficiency [JF note: having the MCAS rely on a single data source, the “angle of attack” indicator, without backup or comparative sensors] sets up the need for pilot training on how to overcome it.

-Boeing’s failure to highlight the change resulted in no specific MCAS pilot training.

Those two big mistakes, it now appears, likely caused two tragic major catastrophes. Shame on Boeing if the final analysis bears these points out.

The corrective action is simple and within the capabilities of any competent airline captain to execute. Certainly easier than dealing with an engine fire or loss of multiple hydraulic systems.

There is a broad spectrum of abilities in any group of pilots, and without an emphasis training, some of them will be unable to overcome the design deficiency, even if the emergency procedure is simple to carry out. All the lights and buzzers going off will freeze the less capable pilot who has not been trained to drill down to what is going on, and to flip the switch. Training has to be to the lowest level of ability, if you’re operating an airline with any significant number of pilots. They all can't be Sully Sullenbergers.
Still waiting on the final investigations to be completed but at the moment the blame is mostly on Boeing and some on FAA for allowing the certification without some further analysis
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Old 03-18-2019, 09:33 AM
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Old 03-18-2019, 12:40 PM
  #90  
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This is going to get messy fast once the facts come out I think. Not bad enough for it to kill Boeing but they are going to take a big hit for sure I think.
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Old 03-18-2019, 01:30 PM
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Originally Posted by gatrhumpy View Post
The MCAS system had a fatal flaw in that the system had the ability to reset itself, even after pilot input. That means that even if the pilots took evasive action to correct a pitch problem, the MCAS would sometimes correct itself and disregard the pilot input.
Well, not really. Not exactly...

True, the normal control column force switch cutout is deactivated when MCAS is active. Normally, pushing/pulling on the control column in the opposite direction of trim would cutout/stop the trim movement. Not so when MCAS is active.

However, using the electrical trim switch or the manual trim wheel in the opposite direction will stop trim movement as well as using the trim cutout switch.

As I see it, the real issue is with a lack of comparative redundancy in the system. From what I understand, there are 2 AOA vanes, one on each side of the aircraft. Each AOA vane feeds a flight control computer (FCC) independently. Only one FCC is active at a time. If the AOA vane feeding the active FCC is sending erroneous readings, then that FCC will activate MCAS (assuming flaps up and autopilot off).

At present, there appears to be no provision for a FCC to compare both AOA readings or for the 2 FCCs to talk to each other, nor is there any logic program to figure out which reading is the correct reading. "Hey dude, my AOA vane says we got a high angle of attack, what are you seeing from your AOA vane?" I'm unclear on whether the active FCC can be switched manually by the pilots.

Seems to me that Boeing rushed this and did not "what if" it enough before releasing the system to production.
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Old 03-18-2019, 02:18 PM
  #92  
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In the electronics industry all companies are self-regulated. There is an industry standard of reliability, and each company is tasked with knowing this standard, knowing their design, and knowing any conflicts between the two. Only when a product is proven to have a reliability problem do the regulators come in and audit the whole design and reliability testing process. It really isn't possible to do it another way. The regulators cannot feasibly study each design and reliability study in a reasonable timeframe that would allow the product to make it to production. At the point they did that, the regulator would be just the same as the company's reliability engineer.

I doubt the aerospace industry can be much different.
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Old 03-18-2019, 03:00 PM
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UL and CSA serve that purpose for electronics.
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Old 03-18-2019, 03:15 PM
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My post was in response to the software engineer in post 86. My company doesn't interact with UL or CSA (Canada?). We conform to AEC and JEDEC standards, but for all intents and purposes, we regulate ourselves to those standards. No third party team analyses our products as far as I know.
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Old 03-18-2019, 03:22 PM
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Gotcha. The electronics themselves are typically required by the market to have a 3rd party cert (cheap shit on Amazon is not though). The software not so much where it does not affect that testing.
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Old 03-18-2019, 04:12 PM
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Old 03-18-2019, 04:13 PM
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The other problem, besides the ones nfn highlighted, was the fact that even if the pilot was 'fighting' his own plane, few pilots actually knew what the plane was doing and when the MCAS was active, hence they had no training on how to cut it off.
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Old 03-18-2019, 04:57 PM
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Cut off MCAS? Well, I'd say "no", considering that pilots weren't briefed that it existed.

Stop the stab trim from running? Yes.

Bold face / memory-item emergency procedure.

Training may very well be the reason why no US-based Max's have crashed, dunno. We need to know how many times MCAS activated unexpectedly on a US-based Max and what was done when it happened....
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Old 03-18-2019, 05:08 PM
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Originally Posted by nfnsquared View Post
....Training may very well be the reason why no US-based Max's have crashed, dunno.....
That's the crazy part.. this may likely be true.


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Old 03-18-2019, 05:42 PM
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CBS just aired a segment on the MAX and they circled a pitot tube on the animation of the plane identifying it as the faulty AOA sensor. LMAO (and disgusted at the same time)...This is what happens when Joe Reporter tries to pass himself off as an aviation professional...
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Old 03-18-2019, 07:05 PM
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Old 03-18-2019, 07:34 PM
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Originally Posted by CCColtsicehockey View Post
This is going to get messy fast once the facts come out I think. Not bad enough for it to kill Boeing but they are going to take a big hit for sure I think.
Reading the following news article....looks like FAA likely was mis-managing the rollout of the new plane as well. Looks like this could have investigators turn over rocks in the FAA offices as well...and not just Boeing who will be in a world of hurt


Originally Posted by nfnsquared View Post
Seems to me that Boeing rushed this and did not "what if" it enough before releasing the system to production.
Looks like this is starting to potentially be the case... along with FAA mis-management.

https://www.seattletimes.com/busines...ion-air-crash/
As Boeing hustled in 2015 to catch up to Airbus and certify its new 737 MAX, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) managers pushed the agency’s safety engineers to delegate safety assessments to Boeing itself, and to speedily approve the resulting analysis.

But the original safety analysis that Boeing delivered to the FAA for a new flight control system on the MAX — a report used to certify the plane as safe to fly — had several crucial flaws.

That flight control system, called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), is now under scrutiny after two crashes of the jet in less than five months resulted in Wednesday’s FAA order to ground the plane.

Current and former engineers directly involved with the evaluations or familiar with the document shared details of Boeing’s “System Safety Analysis” of MCAS, which The Seattle Times confirmed.
  • Understated the power of the new flight control system, which was designed to swivel the horizontal tail to push the nose of the plane down to avert a stall. When the planes later entered service, MCAS was capable of moving the tail more than four times farther than was stated in the initial safety analysis document.
  • Failed to account for how the system could reset itself each time a pilot responded, thereby missing the potential impact of the system repeatedly pushing the airplane’s nose downward.
  • Assessed a failure of the system as one level below “catastrophic.” But even that “hazardous” danger level should have precluded activation of the system based on input from a single sensor — and yet that’s how it was designed.
The people who spoke to The Seattle Times and shared details of the safety analysis all spoke on condition of anonymity to protect their jobs at the FAA and other aviation organizations.

...

The FAA, citing lack of funding and resources, has over the years delegated increasing authority to Boeing to take on more of the work of certifying the safety of its own airplanes.

Early on in certification of the 737 MAX, the FAA safety engineering team divided up the technical assessments that would be delegated to Boeing versus those they considered more critical and would be retained within the FAA.

But several FAA technical experts said in interviews that as certification proceeded, managers prodded them to speed the process. Development of the MAX was lagging nine months behind the rival Airbus A320neo. Time was of the essence for Boeing.

A former FAA safety engineer who was directly involved in certifying the MAX said that halfway through the certification process, “we were asked by management to re-evaluate what would be delegated. Management thought we had retained too much at the FAA.”

“There was constant pressure to re-evaluate our initial decisions,” the former engineer said. “And even after we had reassessed it … there was continued discussion by management about delegating even more items down to the Boeing Company.”

Even the work that was retained, such as reviewing technical documents provided by Boeing, was sometimes curtailed.

“There wasn’t a complete and proper review of the documents,” the former engineer added. “Review was rushed to reach certain certification dates.”

When time was too short for FAA technical staff to complete a review, sometimes managers either signed off on the documents themselves or delegated their review back to Boeing.

“The FAA managers, not the agency technical experts, have final authority on delegation,” the engineer said.
Wow. Heads should roll for this...if the above allegations are found to be true.

And why is not that surprising. Management has killed before....look at challenger disaster for another huge, tragic example.....

Looks like a potential congressional(?) internal fed govt investigation will be coming very soon as well..
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Old 03-18-2019, 07:35 PM
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Originally Posted by nfnsquared View Post
CBS just aired a segment on the MAX and they circled a pitot tube on the animation of the plane identifying it as the faulty AOA sensor. LMAO (and disgusted at the same time)...This is what happens when Joe Reporter tries to pass himself off as an aviation professional...


so much “fake news” / FUD being spread out there by the media. 🤦🏼♂️
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Old 03-18-2019, 11:18 PM
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Originally Posted by nist7 View Post
Wow. Heads should roll for this...if the above allegations are found to be true.

And why is not that surprising. Management has killed before....look at challenger disaster for another huge, tragic example.....

Looks like a potential congressional(?) internal fed govt investigation will be coming very soon as well..
Either the writer wrote this with Challenger in mind, or this is terrible, terrible form. The resemblances to the Challenger tragedy are striking. If this is true, Boeing needs to clean house in its upper management dept.
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Old 03-19-2019, 07:02 AM
  #105  
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Originally Posted by nist7 View Post
Reading the following news article....looks like FAA likely was mis-managing the rollout of the new plane as well. Looks like this could have investigators turn over rocks in the FAA offices as well...and not just Boeing who will be in a world of hurt
That will for sure take some of the spotlight off of Boeing in the US but the FAA is just a US regulatory agency and not global. Do other nations not do their own regulatory analysis of aircraft or do they just say if it is good enough for the FAA then it is good enough for us? If the later is the case then damn the FAA is in for a massive overhaul even more so.
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Old 03-19-2019, 12:45 PM
  #106  
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Holy shitsnacks. As someone who has performed a hazard analysis and risk analysis on multiple different programs and on multiple different systems for the Gov't, the part that nist7 wrote from his article about being one step above catastrophic based on a single sensor, that was alarming.
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Old 03-19-2019, 05:17 PM
  #107  
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I wonder who makes the sensor and what their liability is.
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Old 03-19-2019, 07:58 PM
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I'm guessing zero? The same sensor has probably been in use for hundreds of thousands of hours without incident. My guess is that the error from the sensor has to do with improper maintenance / upkeep...
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Old 03-19-2019, 08:58 PM
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Originally Posted by oo7spy View Post
I wonder who makes the sensor and what their liability is.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/busin...=.33b5a62aa89c

The sensor is especially helpful for nighttime flying, Soucie said, but its loss alone should not create problems that pilots are unable to handle.

The FAA reports include 19 reported cases of sensor trouble on Boeing aircraft, such as an American Airlines flight last year that declared a midflight emergency when the plane’s stall-warning system went off, despite normal airspeed. The Boeing 737-800 landed safely. Maintenance crews replaced three parts, including the angle-of-attack sensor, according to the FAA database.

In 2017, an American Airlines-operated Boeing 767 headed to Zurich declared an emergency and returned to New York. Another angle-of-attack sensor was replaced. And an American Airlines 767 was forced to return to Miami in 2014 after a midflight emergency because of a faulty angle-of-attack sensor.

A Boeing spokesman declined to comment for this report. The FAA did not respond to a request for comment.

The angle-of-attack sensors on the fatal Lion Air flight were made by Minnesota-based Rosemount Aerospace, according to a photograph of the part that was shown by Indonesian officials to reporters after the recovery of the wreckage. It is a model commonly used on commercial aircraft.

A spokeswoman for Rosemount’s parent company, United Technologies, declined to comment.

The angle-of-attack sensor measures the amount of lift generated by the wings. The name refers to the angle between the wing and oncoming air. Its main purpose is to warn pilots when the plane could stall from too little lift, leading to a loss of control.

Many of the sensors include a small vane attached to the outside of a commercial aircraft. Most planes have two or three vanes as part of a redundant system. But they are not complicated machines. The Wright brothers used a version on their first flight.

Placing too much trust in the sensors also can cause trouble. One of the most serious accidents tied to angle-of-attack sensors occurred in 2008, when XL Airways Germany Flight 888T crashed into the Mediterranean Sea, killing seven people. French authorities blamed water-soaked angle-of-attack sensors on the Airbus 320 plane, saying they generated inaccurate readings and set up a chain of events that resulted in a stall.

According to investigators, the downed airplane’s sensors were made by Rosemount, the same company that made the sensors on the Lion Air crash. At the time, Rosemount was also called Goodrich, the company that owned the aerospace manufacturer at the time.

In the Lion Air crash, pilots struggled for control with the 737 Max’s automated flight controls — the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. Faulty readings from the angle-of-attack sensors may have led the MCAS to believe the aircraft was in danger of stalling just as it was taking off from Indonesia, according to the preliminary report by Indonesian investigators. Gaining speed by diving can prevent a stall.

After the crash, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive in November for 737 Max 8 and 9 models that warned a mistakenly high reading from one angle-of-attack sensor “could cause the flight crew to have difficulty controlling the airplane.”

Less is known about the Ethiopian Airlines crash. But it involves the same type of aircraft and crashed at a similar point in its flight path as the Lion Air plane, according to investigators.

Both planes were equipped with the MCAS, which uses angle-of-attack sensors to determine whether a plane is nearing a stall.

Airbus equips many of its commercial jets with its own anti-stall software that relies on an automated process.

During the Lufthansa flight in 2014, faulty information from the angle-of-attack sensors triggered the software, pushing the plane’s nose down, according to German aviation investigators. The program thought the plane was nearing a stall. The captain was eventually able to override the automated system, and the pilots, after talking with a maintenance crew, identified the likely problem and continued the flight to Munich.

Investigators later found that two of the angle-of-attack sensors were blocked, probably by frozen water, and generated improper readings.

European authorities and the FAA issued airworthiness directives over several years aimed at addressing sensor problems on Airbuses.

Airbus A320 planes with certain sensors made by two companies — United Technologies, parent company of Rosemount, which makes Boeing sensors; and Sextant/Thomson — “appear to have a greater susceptibility to adverse environmental conditions” than sensors made by a third company, the FAA said.

One important difference between the Lufthansa incident and the two 737 Max accidents, aviation experts said, was where they occurred.

The Lufthansa plane was soaring at 31,000 feet when it launched into a steep dive. It dropped 4,000 feet in less than a minute before the pilots wrestled back control.

If the sensor problem had hit soon after departure, as investigators suspect it did with the Lion Air crash, that incident could have ended in disaster.
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Old 03-20-2019, 05:02 AM
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...cid=spartandhp


Jesus. I can't imagine literally fighting a plane to go nose up that wants to go nose down.
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Old 03-20-2019, 06:47 AM
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Boeing reshuffles top engineers amid 737 MAX crisis

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Old 03-20-2019, 06:56 AM
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They should be fired!
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Old 03-20-2019, 09:17 AM
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Originally Posted by gatrhumpy View Post
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...cid=spartandhp


Jesus. I can't imagine literally fighting a plane to go nose up that wants to go nose down.
If that report is true, then this is disturbing regarding training:

The captain asked the first officer to check the quick reference handbook, which contains checklists for abnormal events, the first source said.
There is a memory item for the trim running unexpectedly. Should not have needed to consult any book for that.

"They didn't seem to know the trim was moving down," the third source said. "They thought only about airspeed and altitude. That was the only thing they talked about."
I don't see how this could be. The 2 large trim wheels are right there in front of each pilot. How did they miss the trim running for 10 seconds at a time? If this is true, then that would indicate a very poorly trained crew.
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Old 03-20-2019, 09:29 AM
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The sensor mfg shouldn't be liable for this, this is solely the responsibility of Boeing and their software team
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Old 03-20-2019, 09:30 AM
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Originally Posted by gatrhumpy View Post
They should be put in prison!
Fixed
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Old 03-20-2019, 09:43 AM
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Originally Posted by nfnsquared View Post
I don't see how this could be. The 2 large trim wheels are right there in front of each pilot. How did they miss the trim running for 10 seconds at a time? If this is true, then that would indicate a very poorly trained crew.
Originally Posted by Majofo View Post
That's the crazy part.. this may likely be true.
I'm saying.. lack of training, experience.. probably all plays a role.
Pretty easy to get your commercial pilot's license nowadays.
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Old 03-20-2019, 12:18 PM
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Originally Posted by Majofo View Post
Pretty easy to get your commercial pilot's license nowadays.













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Old 03-20-2019, 01:24 PM
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Originally Posted by Majofo View Post
The sensor mfg shouldn't be liable for this, this is solely the responsibility of Boeing and their software team
Yeah, I wasn’t considering that the sensor is only providing information and Boeing created the active system that responds to the data.
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Old 03-20-2019, 01:27 PM
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Originally Posted by Majofo View Post
The sensor mfg shouldn't be liable for this, this is solely the responsibility of Boeing and their software team
Yeah, I don't see it happening. Like I said, those sensors have been highly reliable with few issues given the number of hours they've been in service.
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Old 03-20-2019, 03:39 PM
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What is the Boeing 737 Max Maneuvering Characteristics ...

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...em-mcas-jt610/

Pretty good description of the MCAS system operation
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